Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992

Product Description This book provides both a unique, first-hand account of German and European diplomacy in the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis and a detailed analysis of the major issues. By correcting the many misperceptions and misjudgments about that period, the book will put the debate on Western involvement in the former Yugoslavia on a new and more solid basis.This book presents both a detailed historical account of German diplomacy in the first year of the Yugoslav crisis and a thorough analysis of the issues that Germany and the international community faced at the time. Written by the German diplomat responsible for the conduct of German policy on the working level, the book is a compelling, first-hand view of the motives, perceptions, and actions of the German government.Part I is a chronological treatment of the responses of the European Community and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to developments on the ground―in particular, the military conflict in Croatia and the German role in shaping these responses. Part II provides a systematic treatment of the causes of the conflict and the major issues raised by the Yugoslav crisis, such as questions concerning self-determination, frontiers, the role of history, and the recognition of successor states. Taken together, the two parts provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins of international involvement in the Bosnian war. This book will interest scholars, researchers, and policymakers involved with the Bosnian conflict and contemporary German and international relations. Review "[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse."-?[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.?-??????It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point....?-H-Net Reviews?The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues.?-International Journal"ÝH¨e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomat