Game Theory for Applied Econometricians Data Analytics with R

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- I. Static Games of Complete Information -- 1. Games -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Some Strategic Situations -- 1.2.1. Aliens Attack! -- 1.2.2. Can AI Cope with Traffic? -- 1.3. End of Skyjacking -- 1.3.1. More Security? -- 1.3.2. Hijacking Data using R -- 1.3.3. United Arlines Flight 93 -- 1.4. A Game -- 1.4.1. Definitions -- 1.4.2. Examples -- 1.5. Prisoner's Dilemma -- 1.5.1. The Game -- 1.5.2. What is the Best Outcome? -- 1.5.3. What should You Do? -- 1.5.4. Does This Make Sense? -- 1.6. Empirical Analysis: Friend or Foe using R -- 1.6.1. Trust Box -- 1.6.2. Data Analysis in R -- 1.6.3. Analysis in R -- 1.7. Discussion and Further Reading -- 2. Nash Equilibrium -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. What is a Nash Equilibrium? -- 2.2.1. Dominance -- 2.2.2. Prisoner's Dilemma -- 2.2.3. Coordination Game -- 2.3. Nash Equilibrium -- 2.3.1. Definition -- 2.3.2. Algorithm for Finding Nash Equilibrium -- 2.3.3. Prisoner's Dilemma Game -- 2.3.4. Coordination Game -- 2.4. Entry Games -- 2.4.1. Bresnahan and Reiss -- 2.4.2. Two Firm Entry Game -- 2.4.3. Many Firm Entry Game -- 2.4.4. Nash Equilibrium -- 2.4.5. Fixed Cost of Entry -- 2.4.6. Equilibrium Number of Firms -- 2.4.7. Simulation of Entry Game in R -- 2.5. Empirical Analysis: Tire Markets using R -- 2.5.1. Data -- 2.5.2. Structural Model -- 2.5.3. Entry Estimator -- 2.5.4. Estimation in R -- 2.5.5. Structural Estimation -- 2.5.6. Policy Simulation in R -- 2.6. Discussion and Further Reading -- 3. Oligopoly -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Cournot's Model -- 3.2.1. Two Firm Model -- 3.2.2. Best Response -- 3.2.3. Nash Equilibrium -- 3.2.4. Cournot Model with N Firms -- 3.2.5. Cournot Model in R -- 3.2.6. Solve for the Nash Equilibrium with R -- 3.2.7. Simulation of Cournot Model in R -- 3.3. Bertrand's Model.