International Criminal Tribunals A Normative Defense

Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Table of contents -- Introduction -- 1 Legitimacy -- I The Tribunal of Athena -- II The Tribunal at Nuremberg -- III Problems from a Lack of a Legislature -- IV Problems of Jurisdiction and Legitimacy -- V Legitimacy by Bootstrapping -- 2 Sovereignty -- I The Concept of Sovereignty -- II State Sovereignty and Consent Theories -- III Backdoor Cosmopolitanism -- IV The Principle of Complementarity -- V Federated Sovereignty -- VI The Benefits of International Customary Law -- VII The Abiding Problems with Customary International Law -- 3 Punishment -- I Punishment and International Crimes -- II Deterrence -- III Retribution -- IV Expressivism -- V A Collective Rationale for International Punishment Schemes -- VI Punishing in Practice -- VII International Criminal Tribunals as Sources of Punishment -- 4 Responsibility -- I An Account of Responsibility -- II Individual v. State Responsibility -- III Who, or What, Should Be Blamed and Punished? -- IV Problems with How Defendants Are Selected -- V Mass Crimes, Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability, and the Control Theory -- VI Apportioning Responsibility during Civil War -- VII Resolving the Responsibility Dilemma -- VIII Bystanders and Perpetrators -- IX Some Jurisdictional Issues -- 5 Economic and Other Practical Issues -- I Compliance and Legal Systems -- II Incentives to Conform to Law -- III Suasion -- IV Practical Arguments for International Criminal Tribunals -- V Why Self-Interest Critiques Are Problematic -- VI Effectiveness Concerns -- VII Efficiency Concerns -- 6 Politics -- I Relationship between the Political and the Legal -- II Western European Expansion and Politics in Africa -- III International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa -- IV Effects of Colonialism Today -- V Neocolonialism -- VI Complementarity