The Origins of Dominant Parties Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia

Part 1: Dominant Party Institutions -- Dominant Parties and the Leader's Credible Commitments -- Dominant Parties and Elite Credible Commitments -- Summary -- Overcoming the Commitment Problem, Part 2: Changes in the Balance ... -- Explaining Variation in the Emergence of Dominant Parties: The Limitations of Institutional Explanations -- Reducing the Severity of the Leader's Commitment Problem -- Reducing the Severity of the Elite's Commitment Problem -- Balanced Resources: Maximizing the Likelihood of a Dominant Party -- Theory and Practice: Institutional Evolution in Nascent Dominant Party Systems -- 3 False Starts -- 3.1 The Absence of a Ruling Party in the First Russian Republic: 1990-1993 -- Summary: The First Russian Republic -- 3.2 Russia's Choice: The Failure of Russia's First Party of Power -- Why Yeltsin Failed to Invest in Russia's Choice -- Why Elites Failed to Invest in Russia's Choice -- Summary: The Failure of Russia's Choice -- 3.3 Our Home Is Russia: Russia's Second Failed Party of Power -- The Immediate Causes of Our Home's Failure: Presidential and Regional Neglect -- National Elites and Our Home Is Russia -- Regional Elites and Our Home Is Russia -- The Kremlin and Our Home Is Russia -- Why Yeltsin Did Not Invest in Our Home -- Why Elites Did Not Invest in Our Home Is Russia -- Kremlin Signals and Elites' Reluctance to Invest in Our Home -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4 The Emergence of a Dominant Party in Russia -- 4.1 Initial Failures: The Story of Unity, 1999-2001 -- From Our Home Is Russia to Unity -- The Kremlin and Unity -- Elites and Unity -- Why Elites Were Hesitant to Invest in Unity -- Why the Kremlin Was Hesitant to Invest in Unity -- Summary -- 4.2 The Formation of a Dominant Party in Post-Soviet Russia: The Story of United Russia, 2001-2010 -- The Kremlin and United Russia -- Elites and United Russia -- 4.3 Conclusion